The Post-Crisis Sequencing of Economic Integration in Asia: Trade as a Complement to a Monetary Future by Michael G. Plummer
The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis
Legal address: Via Angherà, 22 – Head office: Via Patara, 3 - 47900 Rimini (RN) – Italy
www.rcfea.org -  secretary@rcfea.org
WP 12-07
MICHAEL G. PLUMMER
Johns Hopkins University SAIS-Bologna
and
Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, Rimini, Italy
GANESHAN WIGNARAJA
Asian Development Bank
“THE POST-CRISIS SEQUENCING OF
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN ASIA:
TRADE AS A COMPLEMENT TO A
MONETARY FUTURE”
Copyright belongs to the author. Small sections of the text, not exceeding three
paragraphs, can be used provided proper acknowledgement is given.
The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA) was established in March 2007.
RCEA is a private, non-profit organization dedicated to independent research in
Applied and Theoretical Economics and related fields. RCEA organizes seminars and
workshops, sponsors a general interest journal The Review of Economic Analysis, and
organizes a biennial conference: Small Open Economies in the Globalized World
(SOEGW). Scientific work contributed by the RCEA Scholars is published in the
RCEA Working Papers series.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. No responsibility for them
should be attributed to the Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.The Post-Crisis Sequencing of Economic Integration in Asia:
Trade as a Complement to a Monetary Future
Michael G. Plummer,1






Bilateral and regional cooperation initiatives in Asia have been growing in importance over the last five years.   
These accords span the real and financial sectors; rather than following the more typical pattern of “trade first, 
money later”, recent policy initiatives involve the simultaneous implementation of trade and monetary/financial 
accords.  Given this sequence, is there a case for monetary union in East Asia?  Is there a case for expanded 
free-trade areas (FTAs) in the region?   This paper attempts to answer these questions using a variety of 
empirical techniques, including a Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) model, to evaluate the economics of 
monetary/financial integration and various configurations of FTAs in Asia. We conclude that, at present, the post-
sequencing of economic integration in Asia is developing such that trade agreements will ultimately complement 
the movement toward financial and monetary integration.  While the political constraint on monetary union is real, 
it is argued that FTAs should help relax this constraint, adding a political complement to the trade complement.
1 Corresponding Author:  Via Belmeloro, 11, 40126 Bologna, Italy, e-mail: mplummer@jhubc.it, tel:  (+39) 051.2917811; 
fax: (+39) 051.228505. A draft version of this paper was presented at the conference, “The Economics of Regional Monetary 
Integration,” organized by The Fraser Institute and the Kiel Institute of World Economic and held in Kiel, 24–26 September, 
2006. The authors are indebted to the participants at the conference for their useful input and suggestions, in particular to the 
organizers (Herbert Grubel, Rainer Schweickert and Rolf Langhammer), and George von Furstenberg (with thanks for his 
patience).  We are also grateful to two anonymous referees. Moreover, thanks are due to Fan Zhai for running the GEMAT 
simulations, to Fidelis Sadicon for research assistance and Cindy Houser for additional comments. The views expressed in 
this paper are those of the authors only and cannot be attributed to the Asian Development Bank or any other organization.   
I. Introduction 
 
The Asian Crisis, currency instability, uncertainties with respect to the future of the 
global international trading system, and the perceived need to cooperate in financial 
areas to complement regional integration initiatives in the areas of trade and 
investment have been important driving forces behind recent discussions in Asia to 
create some form of currency area, be it at the ASEAN
2 level or the “ASEAN+3.”
3 
Beginning with a proposal to study monetary union by President Joseph Estrada of 
the Philippines at the ASEAN Summit in December 1998, the possibility of closer 
financial and monetary integration in ASEAN has been a subject of debate at the 
highest levels. The ASEAN+3 initiative was originally created in part as a first step 
toward closer financial and monetary cooperation in Asia, with the possibility of 
monetary union.   
 
While the subject of monetary union continues to be a popular topic, in practical 
terms little has been done in the direction of its realization. There have been a 
number of initiatives (discussed below) in terms of financial cooperation, but to date 
the most important accords have been in the real sector. In fact, although there were 
no formal free-trade areas (FTAs) in place in East Asia at the turn of the century, 
today several are at fairly advanced stages of implementation and many others are 
being either negotiated or awaiting ratification (see, for example, www.aric.adb.org 
for a list of FTAs in Asia). Perhaps this is due to a “natural” sequencing of economic 
integration, i.e., first the real sector and then monetary integration, which is the 
experience of, for example, the EU. Or perhaps it results from more coincidental 
factors, e.g., the global movement toward FTAs or the fact that, for whatever reason, 
there is a strong demand for economic cooperation, and the real sector is the easiest 
to negotiate in practice and is less compromising in terms of perceived national 
sovereignty. In any event, the region has been far more active in terms of real 
integration than monetary integration, but has nonetheless registered obvious 
interests in engaging in both. This makes it somewhat unique. How this process 
unfolds will be important for not only the region but also, given its size, the entire 
global economy. 
 
Is there a case for monetary union in East Asia? Is there a case for wider FTAs? And 
how do real and monetary integration relate to each other in Asia? This paper 
attempts to address these questions through institutional, theoretical, and empirical 
analysis. Section II gives a brief review of the evolution of East Asian integration, 
including trade cooperation, financial/monetary integration, and exchange-rate 
management, in order to set the stage for subsequent analysis. Section III considers 
the degree to which East Asia resembles an Optimum Currency Area (OCA), with a 
focus on assessing to what degree macroeconomic variables in Asia exhibit 
convergence and growing symmetry. It also considers possible policy convergence 
issues, using the EU’s Maastricht Treaty as a benchmark. Given the FTA zeitgeist in 
Asia and the importance of trade integration in the determination of an OCA, in 
                                                 
2 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created in 1967 with the Bangkok Declaration.  
It began with five members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) and expanded four 
times: Brunei Darussalam (1985), Viet Nam (1995), Lao PDR, and Myanmar (1997), Cambodia (1999). 
3 ASEAN plus the main Northeast Asian countries: People’s Republic of China, Republic of Korea, and 
Japan. 
  2Section IV we run fresh simulations to ascertain which configurations of FTAs in Asia 
would be best for the region. Section V concludes.          
 
II. Survey of East Asian Economic Integration 
 
There are many excellent summaries of East Asian economic integration (see, for 
example, ADB 2006 for a recent analytical review), and doing justice to the many 
accords that are in place would be difficult.  Moreover, as bilateral FTAs have been 
booming in recent years, keeping track of third-party and various bilateral 
arrangements tends to be a moving target.
4 Instead, we limit ourselves to 
summarizing some salient features of recent accords. 
 
 
A. Trade Integration 
 
First, ASEAN economic cooperation features as the most prominent of regional 
accords, representing by far the most important initiatives prior to the Asian Crisis. 
Still, East-Asia-wide initiatives, such as the “ASEAN Plus Three” accords and 
“ASEAN+1” agreements (e.g., the ASEAN-People’s Republic of China [PRC] 
agreement and ongoing negotiations between ASEAN and Japan, India, Republic of 
Korea [Korea], and Australia/New Zealand), are taking on greater importance over 
time.       
 
Despite the many early agreements in ASEAN’s history that were mainly political and 
token in nature
5, its first major initiative was AFTA (1992). The AFTA is already in 
effect in the original ASEAN countries but the transitional ASEAN countries (Viet 
Nam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia) have been granted more time, with Viet Nam 
due to finish by the end of 2006 and others a few more years. ASEAN has also made 
significant strides in the area of investment cooperation, e.g., in the form of ASEAN 
“one-stop investment centers” and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA). These efforts 
at industrial cooperation have been designed with essentially the same goal in mind 
as AFTA: reduce transactions costs associated with intraregional economic 
interaction.   
 
In November 2002, the ASEAN Heads of Government meeting in Phnom Penh 
proposed that the region should consider the possible creation of an “ASEAN 
Economic Community” (AEC) by 2020 (expedited to 2015 in 2007), which would 
create a single market in which goods and services would flow freely, and there 
would be a freer flow of capital and skilled labor. This is by far the most ambitious 
vision for ASEAN economic integration; ASEAN is currently figuring out how it might 
meet its goals, given the fact that it has in place very little besides (almost) tariff-free 
trade. 
 
Second, the region has seen an explosion of bilateral FTAs, all of which being 
between an ASEAN member-country and another country in Asia.  That is, there is 
                                                 
4 For ongoing “status reports” of these agreements, see the websites of the Asian Development Bank, 
www.aric.adb.org.    
5 For example, the Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA), was a positive-list approach to trade liberalization 
with small margins of preference and limited product coverage, expanded somewhat during the 1980s but 
with no real impact on trade. Industrial cooperation, such as the ASEAN Industrial Project (AIP) system, 
never really got off the ground.   
  3currently no bilateral agreement between the main economies in East Asia 
independent of ASEAN member countries, that is, between PRC; Japan; Korea; 
Taipei,China; and Hong Kong, China. This underscores the key importance of 
ASEAN as the central player to date in East Asian regionalism. In fact, this is one of 
the policy factors pushing the AEC: the fear that bilateral agreements between 
ASEAN member countries and nonmembers, some of which have features that are 
more advanced and comprehensive than ASEAN economic integration itself, will 
lead to the dilution and, perhaps, insignificance of ASEAN.  
 
Third, recently there have been a slew of region-wide Asian FTA proposals. These 
would include an Asia Pacific Free Trade Area (APFTA), which would include all 
APEC members,
6 an East Asian Free Trade Area, recently proposed by Japan, and 
a proposal to create an FTA between the ASEAN+3, New Zealand, Australia, and 
India (“ASEAN+6”). None of these proposals has been articulated formally yet, 
though, as noted below, there have been some financial initiatives under the 
ASEAN+3 framework, which essentially covers almost all East Asia. However, it is 
noteworthy that the “noodle-bowl” effect caused by overlapping, inconsistent FTAs 
that have characterized the recent FTA trend in Asia are economically and/or 
politically sub-optimal. In any event, while these schemes are being actively 
discussed at various formal meetings, no official initiatives have been forthcoming.   
  
 
B. Exchange-rate Management 
 
Exchange-rate regimes in Asia differ widely, from various degrees of managed floats 
(e.g., most ASEAN countries, Japan, and Korea) to hard pegs (e.g., PRC and Hong 
Kong, China). There are many excellent reviews of exchange-rate regimes in the 
region (see, for example, ADB 2006). However, they all have one common 
characteristic: the US dollar as the (explicit or implicit) reference currency or anchor.  
In reviewing the evolution of the roles of the US dollar, yen, and euro in East Asia, 
Kawai (2002) notes that the US dollar was either the de facto or de jure anchor in the 
region’s economies prior to the 1997/98 Asian crisis. During the crisis the role of the 
US dollar declined but in its aftermath the US dollar generally assumed its traditional 
role as anchor. Still, its importance diminished in certain countries (e.g., Indonesia) 
and there has been greater flexibility in exchange-rate management. As of early 
2007, the role of the US dollar continues to be prevalent, but there are some 
indications of certain strains and a desire to diversify is in evidence. Weakness in the 
US dollar appears to have led some countries (e.g., PRC) to announce explicit 
reserve diversification strategies. Thailand in December 2006 even (briefly) imposed 
capital controls in order to prevent further appreciation of the baht against the dollar, 
reflecting problems associated with continued sterilization of foreign exchange 
interventions over a long period of time (holdings of US dollars by the region’s central 
banks are at historical highs).   
 
Numerous studies in the literature evaluate alternative exchange-rate regimes in 
Asia. Kwan (2001), for example, considers from an institutional/political-economy 
                                                 
6 This proposed agreement, which was intended to replace the APEC goal of a region of “open trade and 
investment” by 2010 for developed countries (2020 for developing countries), ostensibly has support of 
private sector organizations in the Asia Pacific and some academics, but has not been considered officially 
as of the time of this writing.  
  4perspective the case for closer exchange-rate management in Asia, with a focus on 
the potential role of the Japanese yen in future arrangements. McKibbin (2004) 
evaluates the performance of several potential Asian exchange-rate arrangements 
with respect to their effects on output and inflation variability in the presence of 
various shocks, and finds that no regime dominates in the presence of all shocks but 
the regimes of floating and a basket peg to the US dollar, euro and yen generally 
perform better than an Asian currency union or yen-zone regime.     
 
There continues to be a strong appetite in the region for various proposals regarding 
future exchange-rate management and cooperation, even if there has been little or 
no concrete progress in this regard at the policy level (as will be discussed below, 
various forms of monetary union in Asia have been tabled by academics but these 
have not been considered seriously in policy discussion). Arguably, this desire 
relates to the problems associated with the Asian crisis. This “contagion” effect of the 
crisis, which began in Thailand on 2 July 1997 and quickly spread to Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines, and ultimately Korea and even Hong Kong, China took the 
region by surprise, particularly since the potential for “real contagion” was thought to 
be small given the relatively-low levels of trade integration between the affected 
economies at the time. However, the contagion effect was devastating. Kim, et. al. 
(2002) separate contagion into several separate categories, with bilateral real 
integration just being one (and a small part of it).
7 The others would include 
competition in third markets,
8 “financial contagion,” which relates to international 
investor’s behavior during a crisis; and “pure contagion,” which could be “herd 
behavior,” informational cascades, and the like. Kim, et. al. (2002) argue that all 
these channels played a role in the crisis and survey the relevant literature.   
 
For Asian policymakers, this contagion effect clearly underscored the “policy 
externalities” associated with macroeconomic and financial policies in an 
increasingly-integrated region, which in turn has given birth to a variety of 
approaches geared to endogenize at least in part these externalities. We discuss 
these initiatives below. Suffice it to note that the presence of contagion at higher 
levels of integration (see, for example, Candelon, Piplack and Straetmans 2006 and 
Dungey, et. al. 2004) reinforces arguments in favor of monetary union.         
 
     
C.  Financial/Monetary Integration 
 
One might trace the first initiative in favor of monetary/financial cooperation in East 
Asia to be the original “Miyazawa Plan,” which was initiated by Japan during the 
Asian Crisis to create an Asian Monetary Fund to supplement the IMF.  It was 
opposed by the IMF and the United States (US), but eventually led to the 
establishment of currency swap arrangements among East Asian countries (basically 
                                                 
7 Glick and Rose (1999), for example, examine five currency crisis episodes and find that countries affected 
by crisis have strong trade relations with the country that was the first victim of the crisis episode.  But this 
effect is not important relative to other channels.  Moreover, in the case of the Asian Crisis, Thailand 
accounted for only between 1 percent and 4.5% of the exports of the affected Asian economies.  
8 That is, if a crisis hits Thailand and Malaysia and Thailand compete significantly in the US market, a strong 
devaluation of the baht would impact the competitiveness of Malaysia, which would lead investors to sell 
short Malaysian ringgit. For analysis of this type of competitiveness effect in the Asian crisis context, see 
Kochar, Loungani, and Stone (1998), who find that this type of trade channel played an important role in the 
crisis. 
  5bilateral swaps between Japan and individual countries) during the annual meeting 
of the Asian Development Bank in May 2000 (the “Chiang Mai Agreement”). These 
swaps have grown in terms of nominal values to approximately $75 billion (May 
2006).   
 
There have also been proposals to integrate capital markets in the region, from 
modest proposals to coordinate more closely existing national capital markets, to 
more ambitious proposals such as the creation of supranational regional bond and 
stock exchanges. The main issues relate to integration as opposed to capital market 
development more generally, although one motivation for integration is typically to 
foster development of the market.   
 
Interest in stock market integration arises primarily because financial theory suggests 
that an integrated regional stock market is more efficient than segmented national 
capital markets. Capital market efficiency in Southeast Asia has become even more 
important after the Asian financial crisis. Southeast Asian countries are specifically 
seeking to reduce the traditional dependence of firms on bank loans rather than bond 
and stock issuances, and at the same time are seeking new capital from outside the 
region.   
 
With an integrated regional stock market, investors from all member countries will be 
able to allocate capital to the locations in the region where it is the most productive.  
With more cross-border flows of funds, additional trading in individual securities will 
improve the liquidity of the stock markets, which will in turn lower the cost of capital 
for firms seeking capital and lower the transaction costs investors incur. These 
suggest a more efficient allocation of capital within the region. 
 
From the perspective of a portfolio investor outside the region, stock market 
integration suggests that separate markets move together and have high 
correlations, so there is less benefit from portfolio diversification across countries. 
However, an integrated regional stock exchange will be more appealing to investors 
from outside the region who would find investment in the region easier or more 
justifiable. As shares become more liquid and transaction costs fall, fund managers 
become increasingly willing to take positions in the stocks. In addition, outside 
investors may take notice of the regional stock exchange instead of dismissing a 
collection of small national exchanges: the whole (one regional stock exchange) 
might be greater than the sum of the parts (individual country exchanges). Click and 
Plummer (2005) find evidence of co-integration of the original ASEAN-5 stock 
markets, which would bode well for the creation of a regional market. Candelon, 
Piplack and Straetmans 2006 come to the same conclusion; they consider five 
different Asian economies (Malaysia; Thailand; Taipei,China; Singapore; and Korea) 
and find an increased co-movement of these stockmarkets during periods of boom 
and bust, with a common break in 1997 (which can only be interpreted as an “Asian 
Flu” effect).    
 
With respect to fixed-income markets, the need to finance emerging government 
deficits in the region, robust demand for infrastructural projects, and ambitious 
business plans of many private-sector companies make the development of bond 
markets a natural priority, though a major challenge. Fixed-income instruments are 
important not only as an additional financial vehicle but also as a complement to 
equity markets. Firms may wish to raise medium- and long-term financial capital 
  6without relinquishing more control of the firm, or possibly as a complement to equity 
issuances (or vice versa; major corporate bond issues are often accompanied by 
warrants). Moreover, ASEAN governments in particular have recognized that a 
stronger and more extensive local bond market can be strong protection against 
maturity and currency “mismatches.” While ASEAN launched a study on the 
possibility of creating an ASEAN bond market in 2002–2003, the idea was essentially 
put on a back-burner in favor of an ASEAN+3 framework, which would include the 
major financial players in Asia. For example, the December 2002 “Asian Bond 
Markets Initiative” established a (small but growing) bond pool under the auspices of 
the Bank for International Settlements.   
 
Nevertheless, financial and monetary cooperation in Asia continues to be at a 
conceptual stage. Even its most successful cooperative effect, the Chiang Mai 
Initiative, relatively lacks ambition if one considers that its swaps totaling $75 billion 
(May 2006) will be drawn from reserves that are currently at about $2.5 trillion. But 
the economics seem to support such initiatives.   
 
 
III. Do Macroeconomic and Policy Trends in Asia Support Monetary Union? 
 
Ever since the World Bank’s publication of the East Asian Miracle (World Bank 
1993), the successful, export-oriented approach to economic development has been 
a model for developing countries. Of course, the region’s remarkable trade 
performance has been made possible by general political stability, stable 
macroeconomic policies, and market-oriented microeconomic reforms (see, for 
example, World Bank 1993, World Bank 2006, and ADB 2006). While an exhaustive 
review of the determinants of the “East Asian Miracle” would go beyond the scope of 
this paper, suffice it to note that more than any other region in the developing world, 
Asia has been able to exploit to its advantage the global marketplace and 
globalization. 
 
As has been well-documented,
9 over the past 20 years the region has been highly 
successful in raising living standards (and, with it, reducing poverty significantly) and 
in maintaining healthy macroeconomic indicators. Moreover, it exhibits a classic 
process of structural change as the economic development proceeds apace, with 
agricultural falling in importance while services (and, usually, manufactures) rise.
10   
 
There has also been a process of convergence at work. As Barro and Sala-I-Martin 
(2004) show, while the hypothesis of global economic convergence (“beta” 
convergence) can be rejected with reasonable degrees of confidence, there is 
evidence of “conditional convergence”.
11 But East Asia is the only region where 
economies are catching up unambiguously with each other and the OECD (World 
Bank 2006). For example, while the per capita incomes of Singapore and 
                                                 
9 ADB (2006) and World Bank (2006) each give excellent reviews of these processes, but the literature is 
large. 
10 The exception in terms of services is Thailand, whose share actually falls slightly.  However, this reflects a 
problem with collection of services data in Thailand:  in short, laborers who work only part time in agriculture 
are included as agricultural workers, even if they generally rely on employment in services as their most 
important source of income. 
11 In calculating “conditional convergence,” the authors only include countries that meet certain criteria, that 
is, countries with hyper-inflation, political instability, and the like are excluded from the database.  
  7Taipei,China were about half that of Japan in 1985, by 2004 they had almost caught 
up to Japan…and Hong Kong, China actually surpassed it.
12 Korea’s per capita GDP 
was still one-third lower than that of Japan in 2004 but its catching-up process has 
been impressive, with per capita GDP virtually quadrupling since 1985.
13 Most 
ASEAN countries also exhibited notable catch-up relative to Japan (and other OECD 
countries). The most remarkable story, however, is that of PRC, which has been 
transformed from a poor, isolated, autarkic economy into an economic powerhouse 
in a generation. This dramatic transformation is attributable to a major overhaul of 
economic policy that has embraced (and, in some ways, is now leading) 
globalization, rather than resisting it as in the past.               
 
This outward-oriented approach to economic development, which has been a key 
engine of growth in Asia, has made it a natural candidate for regional economic 
integration initiatives in a world that is increasingly eschewing a multilateral approach 
to trade policy in favor of bilateralism and regionalism. In addition to the need to 
reclaim most-favored nation status in key markets (“defensive” regionalism), FTAs in 
Asia are being used as a means to address key areas that have been hitherto 
excluded in the WTO talks.  
 
A. The Economics of Monetary Union:  Is Asia an Optimum Currency Area? 
 
There exist several studies in the literature that attempt to address the question of 
whether or not some sort of Asian currency area would make sense, often using the 
experience of monetary union in Europe as a yardstick. Such comparisons are only 
natural. The theory of OCAs does not provide us with an optimal "threshold"; 
however, if it is assumed that the EU makes sense as a currency area, comparisons 
of indicators between what the EU was like prior to monetary union and what Asia is 
now would be appropriate.   
 
Perhaps the most comprehensive works on the subject thus were undertaken by 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1999) and Bayoumi, Eichengreen, and Mauro (1999). 
They use a variety of indicators consistent with the OCA literature, from analysis of 
intra-regional trade to correlations of aggregate supply shocks, to compare the EU 
prior to Maastricht and Asia/ASEAN today.
14 They find that, in general, Asia comes 
as close to meeting OCA criteria as Europe did.  However, they note that historically 
the essential preconditions for a durable regional monetary arrangement depend 
critically on politics rather than economics. In this sense, Asia looks much less like 
an OCA. Nicolas (1999) essentially comes to the same conclusion in terms of 
political limitations but is less sanguine with respect to the economics of a currency 
area in ASEAN. Tang (2006) focuses on symmetry of supply and demand shocks 
and speed of adjustment in evaluating possible configurations of monetary union 
across major Asian economies. He finds that smaller subgroupings of economies in 
Asia (e.g., Malaysia and Singapore; ASEAN more generally; Hong Kong and 
Taiwan) fit the OCA criteria better than a general Asian monetary union. 
                                                 
12 World Bank Development Indicators database; CEIC database. 
13 Ibid. 
14 One problem with the Bayoumi, Eichengreen, and Mauro (1999) paper is that they define ASEAN to 
include all of its official member states, including the most recent members, i.e., Viet Nam, Lao PDR, 
Cambodia, and Myanmar. None of these countries would be a candidate for monetary integration of various 
sorts in the short- or medium run, given their low level of economic and financial development, closed 
financial markets, and unconvertible currencies.  
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One way to evaluate the OCA symmetry criterion is to estimate correlations of 
macroeconomic variables between members of a proposed currency group over time 
using high frequency data. The more highly correlated these variables are 
throughout the business cycle, the greater the implied symmetry of economic 
structures of the component members of the group, and the more likely the group 
would constitute an OCA. Kose, et.al. (2003) use overall output (real GDP) as the 
key macroeconomic variable for the ASEAN-5, Korea, and Taipei,China. The results 
show fairly high (positive) cross-correlations of output between most ASEAN 
countries and between individual countries and the Asian aggregates. For example, 
correlations between the ASEAN-5 countries and the Asia Cycle 2 aggregate fall in 
the range of 0.36 (Philippines) and 0.49 (Singapore). Moreover, with the exception of 
Indonesia, correlation coefficients have generally been rising over time. Excluding 
Indonesia, they increased over time in all cases expect that of Malaysia-Philippines. 
The highest correlations in period 2 were found between Malaysia and Indonesia 
(0.73); Singapore and Thailand (0.63); and Singapore and Malaysia (0.58). In 
general, correlations between ASEAN countries are often higher than with the 
general Asia group aggregates.    
 
In short, it would be difficult to state unequivocally that East Asia constitutes an OCA. 
However, macroeconomic trends and symmetry analysis would suggest that at least 
it is moving in that direction, and if the EU is used as the benchmark, it already may 
be there. Moreover, the “endogeneity” process noted by Frankel and Rose (1998) 
would suggest that, should Asia join in monetary union, the convergence indicators 
would be reinforced. Nevertheless, the political status quo, particularly in Northeast 
Asia, would preclude such an arrangement—at least in the short-run. But the 
confluence of closer trade integration and the emergence of an “Asian identity” could 
well enhance the potential for a removal of existing political obstacles.            
 
The Maastricht Treaty created considerable excitement in the discipline of 
international economics regarding the economic logic behind monetary union. Since 
then, there have been hundreds of studies estimating the economic effects of 
monetary union. Grubel (2006) gives an excellent survey of the economics of 
monetary union, using a framework that is highly relevant to the Asian case. In this 
section, we review both the convergence of financial indicators and survey the 
literature on monetary union in Asia, with a focus on studies related to symmetry of 
economic structure.   
 
Figure 1 shows GDP growth rates for the ASEAN+3, both individually and as a 
group.  Figure 1a is based on annual data for the period 1980–2005, whereas 
Figure  1b employs quarterly data for the period 1994–2006Q3.
15 Clearly, the 
ASEAN+3 economic performance has been impressive; growth has been strong for 
just about all countries (the Philippines is an exception) outside the 1997Q3–1998Q4 
Asian Crisis period.  
 
                                                 
15 Data for Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, and Cambodia were not available for the annual data calculations; 
data for Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Lao PDR were unavailable for the quarterly-based 
calculations. 
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Figure 1b: GDP Growth (%) of ASEAN5+3 
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Sources: CEIC, IMF World Economic Outlook Database, and World Bank World Development Indicators 
Online.
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A process of convergence also appears to be in evidence. In order to capture this 
process, we calculate correlation coefficients between individual-country growth and 
the ASEAN+3 for pre- and post-crisis periods using annual (Table 1a) and quarterly 
(Table 1b) data. The results are illuminating. Table 1a shows that while in the pre-
crisis period not one correlation coefficient was statistically significant (and many 
were negative), in the post-crisis period half of them were. Moreover, the statistically-
significant coefficients are all positive and remarkably high, i.e., in the range of 0.81 
and 0.95. The same results generally obtain using quarterly data (Table 1b), with 
lower estimated coefficients but a higher number of statistically-significant ones (only 
Malaysia’s continues to be statistically insignificant). 
 
In combination with the existing literature summarized above, these results give 
strong support to the view that, while we do not know if East Asia constitute an OCA, 
we can be confident that symmetry in the region is increasing and is high for just 
about every country. But the literature points to two other possible criteria: factor 
flows and degree of interdependence. With respect to the former, the prognosis is 
less optimistic: intraregional labor flows are very small even by international 
standards (World Bank 2006b) and intraregional flows of foreign direct investment 
are relatively low.
16 On the other hand, intraregional trade shares are relatively high 
and growing. As can be seen from Figure 2, while the share of sub-regional trade in 
ASEAN is relatively low for most countries except the transitional economies, East 
Asia is becoming increasingly important in the trade of just about all regional 
economies since 2001, though the trend is not generally monotonic. In fact, no 
economy in the region undertakes less than 40% of its trade with other East Asian 
partners, and for most the share is 60% or more. This is especially impressive when 
one remembers from the above discussion that, unlike the EU, no preferential trading 
arrangements were really in place to influence these trade shares with the 
(theoretical) exception of AFTA. 
 
As Rana (2006) argues, this process of rising intraregional trade is being led by intra-
industry trade. He uses a gravity model to show that the rise in economic symmetry 
in the region derives from this increase in intra-regional trade. The literature would 
suggest that this process would bode well for a continuing “endogenous” process of 
increasing symmetry.   
 
                                                 
16 UNCTAD, FDI Statistics online. For example, intraregional FDI in ASEAN comes to only 13% of the total. 
Singapore is an FDI hub in ASEAN (accounting for two-thirds of FDI in the region) but its major sources are 
from outside the region, particularly the EU and the US. Japan, and Korea only account for about 1% of 
global flows of FDI each. Only PRC really stands out as a major recipient of FDI flows from the region 
(mainly from Hong Kong, China; Japan; and Taipei,China). 
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Table 1a: Correlation of GDP Growth Rates between Individual Countries  
and ASEAN+3: 1980–2005 
1/  
      
   1980 to 1997   1998 - 2005   
China, People’s Republic of  -0,41  0,58   
Indonesia -0,23  0.9036*   
Japan -0,14  0.8103*   
Korea, Rep. of  0,28  0,53   
Lao PDR  -0,39  0,68   
Malaysia -0,20  0.8824*   
Philippines -0,19  0.9496*   
Singapore -0,16  0,69   
Thailand 0,46  0.8635*   
Viet Nam  -0,24  0,70   
      
* Significant at 5% level.       
      
1/ ASEAN+3 excludes Brunei, Cambodia, and Myanmar. Regional GDP growth is weighted by gross 
national income (atlas method, current $). 
      




Table 1b: Correlation of GDP Growth Rates between Individual Countries  
and ASEAN5+3: First Quarter 1994 to Third Quarter 2006 
1/   
      
   Q11994–Q41997 Q11998–Q32006   
China, People’s Republic of  -0,16  0.5117*   
Indonesia 0,33  0.7633*   
Japan -0,08  0.7690*   
Korea, Rep. of  0,08  0.5312*   
Malaysia 0,35  0,81   
Philippines 0,33    0.8479*   
Singapore -0,31  0.7322*   
Thailand 0,06  0.7971*   
      
* Significant at 5% level.       
      
1/ Regional GDP growth is weighted by gross national income (atlas method, current $). 
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B. Macroeconomic Policy Diversity in East Asia: Would Maastricht Criteria Be 
Possible?   
      
As part of the monetary union process in Europe, it became clear that some policy 
harmonization was necessary in order to ensure a stable regime. The famous 
“Maastricht Criteria,” later reinforced by the Stability and Growth Pact, had four 
principal requirements: (1) debt/GDP should be no greater than 60 percent (though 
this indicator was downplayed given the greater than 100% shares in Belgium and 
Italy); (2) any deficit/GDP should be no more than three percent; (3) the inflation rate 
and nominal interest rate of a country should be no greater than 1.5% higher than 
the average of the lowest three countries; and (4) there should be no realignment of 
a country’s exchange-rate peg in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) for 2 years prior to acceding to monetary union.  
Thus, the main goal was macroeconomic policy harmonization and stability.   
 
There has been considerable debate on the economic logic of the Maastricht criteria 
in general, and the actual numeric criteria in particular. But if we were to subject East 
Asia to the same test, how would it fare? 
 
First, fiscal policy would generally receive high marks, especially relative to the EU.  
The share of government spending in GDP in the NIEs (less than 25 percent), 
ASEAN (11–30% range, save the peculiar cases of Brunei and Myanmar), and China 
(18 percent) are low relative to the EU average, even though as developing countries 
this is not a surprising outcome,.
17,18 Japan’s share is somewhat higher (37%) but 
this is among the lowest in the OECD (though, of course, its debt/GDP ratio of over 
165% is the highest in the OECD). With respect to budget deficits, Table 2 shows 
that there is a good deal of variability across East Asia. Deficit/GDP ratios of the 
ASEAN countries were less than three percent for all original ASEAN countries save 
Malaysia (3.8%), but only Viet Nam among the transitional economies would meet 
the Maastricht inflation criterion. Singapore actually had a surplus of 8% of GDP. It is 
interesting to note that the crisis-affected ASEAN countries had surpluses or 
essentially balanced budgets on the eve of the crisis. Since then, they have tended 
to have modest deficits, with the occasional exception of Thailand. The deficits of 
PRC and Taipei,China (2004) came to approximately 1-2%, while Korea and Hong 
Kong, China had surpluses. Only Japan, which currently has a deficit/GDP of about 
5% and has not met the Maastricht criteria since 1993, would fail the test outright. 
Hence, with the exception of Japan and a few of the smaller, transitional ASEAN 
economies, reaching a 3% target would not be particularly difficult for East Asia. 
 
By developing-country standards, East Asia has been characterized by conservative 
monetary policies and price stability. Inflation rates in the ASEAN countries are in the 
0–10.5% range (with Indonesia defining the upper bound); PRC and the NIEs have  
                                                 
17 With a smaller tax base, potential fiscal burdens are less.   
18 All data for this section not included in Table 2 are taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database; 
World Bank Development Indicators Database; ADB Key Economic Indicators; or the OECD Statistics 
Database.   
  14Public Sector Debt  
(% of GDP) 
1/




Interest Rate (%) 
2/
Japan … -5,2 -0,3 0,1
People's Republic of China 19,2 -1,6 1,8 2,5
NIEs-3
Hong Kong, China … 0,3 1,1 3,2
Republic of Korea 22,0 0,8 2,7 3,7
Taipei,China 30,3 -1,0 2,3 1,5
ASEAN
Brunei Darussalam … … 0.9 
3/ …
Cambodia … -3,1 5,8 …
Indonesia 58,3 -0,5 10,5 10,3
Lao PDR … -6,0 7,2 …




Philippines 101,3 -2,7 7,6 7,0
Singapore … 8,0 0,4 2,3
Thailand 49,4 0,1 4,5 3,3
Viet Nam 40,8 -2,3 8,3 …
1/ Refers to consolidated government debt except for Indonesia, Korea, and Taipei,China which refer to 
central government debt while Philippines refer to nonfinancial public sector debt.
2/ Money market rate.
3/ As of 2004.
Sources: Asia Economic Monitor (December 2006), Asian Development Outlook (2006), and Bloomberg.




inflation rates of less than 3%; and Japan continued to be in a deflationary state in 
2005 (-0.3%). Thus, while inflation in the region is generally under control, there 
exists considerable disparity in terms of inflation rates. It is worth noting, however, 
that the inflation criterion for Maastricht has been a source of major disagreement:  
for example, if Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden were experiencing 
deflation, would it make sense to use their average as a reference point, given their 
relative sizes and falling prices? If we did the same for East Asia, we would calculate 
an average 0.3% percent (Singapore, Japan, and Brunei Darussalam), meaning that 
all countries with inflation rates above 1.8% would be ineligible. While this would 
seem normal to the European Central Bank, whose inflation target is 2% or less, it 
would mean that 12 out of 15 countries would fail to meet the criteria. In any event, it 
would take some effort to force relative convergence of inflation rates, though this 
would not be a task that would be much more difficult than it was in Europe. The 
same story generally applies to interest rates, though divergence is much less than 
for inflation. However, as most East Asia countries have underdeveloped bond 
markets, it is unclear if economy-wide interest rates reflect the true price of risk in the 
economy, due to, inter alia, lack of liquidity in the market.  In addition, there is no 
doubt a far greater spread of risk across bonds in East Asia than there was in the 
case of the EU.   
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Finally, regarding exchange rates, Japan and the NIEs have been characterized by 
high trend volatility relative to each other and, particularly, compared to the ASEAN 
countries. This is a reflection of both institutional arrangements (e.g., pegs, managed 
float, and float) and underlying macroeconomic variables. ASEAN exchange rates, 
however, pretty much seem to move in step with each other since the early 1990s, 
reflecting in large part the implicit or explicit peg to the US dollar. In any event, these 
regimes have been developed in an independent context; certainly, prior to any 
movement toward monetary union the regime would require an exchange-rate 
mechanism (such as the ERM/EMS prior to monetary union). 
 
In short, while there is no magic number that one could assign to the degree of 
economic symmetry across these countries in terms of basic macroeconomic 
variables, empirical assessments would support the view that ASEAN+3 countries 
are increasingly symmetric, and the share of intra-regional trade in total trade is 
relatively high and rising. This process is being bolstered by increasing shares of 
intra-industry trade. Moreover, with respect to policy harmonization, the conclusion is 
mixed: fiscal policies could be fairly easily harmonized, whereas the monetary 
variables might take some doing.  In any event, any policy decision to move toward 




IV. Computational Scenarios of East Asian Integration 
 
As noted above, while Asia has embraced various forms of monetary/financial and 
trade integration simultaneously, it has been far more active in negotiating real-
sector accords.  The ultimate implications of formal trade accords are complicated, 
including the “static” effects of integration (i.e., trade creation and diversion), dynamic 
effects (e.g., FDI creation and diversion, productivity effects, economies of scale) 
and various political-economy implications of preferential trading arrangements. The 
fact that Asian countries have been negotiating FTAs with both Asian and non-Asian 
countries suggests that the ultimate effect of the FTA movement in Asia is a priori 
indeterminant: it could either lead to an increase or a decrease in intraregional trade 
and investment.   
 
To the extent that FTAs change intraregional real-sector integration, ceteris paribus 
the FTA movement will be important in determining whether or not formal trade 
integration will support an OCA in Asia. Trade has obviously been an important part 
of the story in the evolution of integration in the EU. While authors
19 differ with 
respect to their conclusions as to whether or not trade integration will ultimately 
increase (due to lower regional transactions costs) or actually decrease (due to 
greater specialization) following the introduction of the euro, the high degree of trade 
integration prior to monetary union in Europe is generally considered to have been 
an important criterion for success, along with other traditional variables reviewed 
above, e.g., economic symmetry and free factor flows. For example, Babetskii (2005) 
uses a technique that employs time-varying coefficients of supply and demand shock 
asymmetry with indicators of trade intensity and exchange rates and finds that, intra-
                                                 
19 See, for example, the review in De Grauwe (2005).  
  16alia, an increase in trade intensity leads to higher symmetry of demand shocks, 
which in turns supports an OCA.   
 
Even before the many FTAs in Asia have been able to have any discernable effect, 
the process of real integration in Asia is increasing the potential gains from monetary 
union (as noted above) and appears to be driving at least in part the symmetry of 
economic structure in the region (Rana 2006). To the extent that FTAs serve to 
reinforce this process (“flag following trade”), benefits will be magnified.     
 
In short, future FTAs could play an important complementary role in setting the stage 
for monetary integration and, in the long-run, monetary union in Asia.  The type of 
FTAs developed will likely make a difference, however. In the remainder of this 
section, we consider the aggregate economic effects of a series of possible 
scenarios in the region. In sum, we find that an ASEAN+3 scenario would generate a 
far better outcome for the region than the existing mix of bilateral FTAs and, in fact, 
would yield a majority of gains in an all-Asia scenario. Coupled the results of 
Section III in which economic symmetry in ASEAN+3 has been rising significantly, 
such a scheme might be an attractive policy option.              
 
 
A. A CGE Model of Trade Scenarios in Asia 
 
There is increasing academic interest in examining the economic effects of East 
Asian FTAs using global computable general equilibrium (GCGE) models. This 
interest stems from advances in GCGE model development and computing power as 
well as strong international policy attention on the implications of an East Asia FTA. 
Policy makers are particularly interested in understanding the magnitude of the 
benefits of an East Asian FTA for member countries, the possible losses to non 
members, and sector-level gains and losses for members and non-members alike.  
But they are also important to the analysis of the future of economic integration in the 
region, including proposals related to the “Asian Economic Community” and, of 
course, Asian monetary union.   
 
By relying on a simulation approach to analyze the economic effects of policy 
changes due to the formation of an East Asia FTA, GCGE models can shed light on 
these issues. The GCGE models used in empirical studies have varied somewhat in 
their underlying economic structure, behavior of agents and focus but commonly use 
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database to examine an ASEAN+3 policy 
scenario or an APEC policy scenario. The primary focus of such policy scenarios is 
on the removal of price distortions against imports that arise from existing trade 
barriers and other sources. Most studies have used the standard GTAP model
20 with 
constant returns to scale in production, perfect competition, and the Armington 
assumption (or some variant of GTAP) while a few have adopted GCGE models with 
firm-level imperfect competition.  
 
Four major findings from the formation of an East Asian FTA are indicated by GCGE 
studies (see Ballard and Cheong, 1997; Urata and Kyota, 2003; Gilbert et al. 2004; 
and Lee et al., 2004): 
                                                 
20 See Hertel (1997). For more details about the current standard GTAP model see 
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu 
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1)  all the countries involved would collect welfare gains;  
2)  the countries that are excluded are much more likely to suffer welfare losses;  
3)  production of sectors with a comparative advantage increases;  
4)  an East Asian FTA is a step toward multilateral liberalization.  
 
Depending on the GCGE model used and data sources, studies, however, differ in 
their estimates of welfare gains to members and losses to non members from an 
East Asia FTA. For example, Urata and Kyota (2003) estimate from GTAP 
simulations that an ASEAN+3 FTA will generate welfare gains for members from the 
highest of 12.5% of GDP for Thailand and 6.6% for Viet Nam to the lowest of 0.19% 
for Japan and 0.64% for the PRC. They find modest welfare loses for non-members 
of -0.02% for the EU, -0.09% for the US and -0.29% for Australia/New Zealand. Also 
using GTAP, Gilbert et al. (2004) find that an ASEAN+3 FTA will produce higher 
welfare gains for members than a PRC-Japan-Korea FTA indicating that broadening 
FTAs brings benefits. They report lower welfare gains from an ASEAN+3 FTA for 
Viet Nam (3.1%) and Thailand (1.6%) than Urata and Kyota (2003). From their 
LINKAGE CGE model, Lee et al. (2004) show significantly higher welfare gains from 
an ASEAN+3 FTA for PRC+Hong Kong, China (4%) and Japan (1.6%), notable 
gains for Korea (3.7%) and ASEAN as a group (4%) and welfare losses for the rest 
of the world of under -0.2%. Using a GCGE model with firm-level imperfect 
competition, Ballard and Cheong (1997) indicate that both an APEC FTA and an 
East Asian FTA would generate gains for all members even without the participation 
of the US and Japan. They go on to show that developing nations of Asia are 
expected to gain more when the US joins the FTA than when Japan joins.  
 
Furthermore, some studies point to how regional trade and country specializations 
could evolve in the future. One might expect that an East Asia FTA would increase 
the share of intraregional trade as well as the degree of specialization of each 
country according to comparative advantage. In part this effect might arise from an 
enlarged regional market resulting from elimination of trade barriers which gives 
more scope for differentiated products. Nonetheless, the available CGE simulation 
studies indicate a mixed and inconclusive picture of the likely effects of an East Asia 
FTA on regional trade and country specializations. For instance, Urata and 
Kyota (2003) suggest that such effects may be small in the case of an ASEAN+3 
FTA. They argue that “the results show that the impact of an East Asia FTA are not 
large enough to change the composition of each country’s exports and imports 
substantially” (2003, pp. 12–13). They suggest that 5% changes in exports are 
indicated for a few sectors like mining and textiles in Viet Nam and food and 
beverages in Korea and Thailand. For other sectors and countries the changes in 
exports are found to be mostly less than 1% (with some are less than 5%). Likewise, 
Urata and Kyota argue that an ASEAN+3 FTA may not significantly expand intra-
industry trade. In contrast, Gilbert et al. (2004) looking at production effects (rather 
than exports) of an ASEAN+3 FTA find large changes in value added including 
declines of between 13% to 42% in the automobile sector in most member countries, 
rises in the textile sector of between 5–10% in many member countries, and 
increases in electronics of between 2% to 8% in some member countries. If the 
changes in value added indicated by Gilbert et al. (2004) mirror changes in exports, 
  18then it is likely that an ASEAN+3 FTA may have notable impacts on intra-industry 
trade and country specialization. Further work is needed on this important issue 
using a combination of CGE analysis and industry-level studies. Such an exercise is 
beyond the scope of the current study.  
 
Bchir and Fouquin (2006) use the CEPII Mirage model to create several scenarios of 
economic integration based on hub-and-spoke (ASEAN+1 agreements) and Asian 
regional approaches, as well as whether or not the agreements will be all-inclusive or 
would exclude sensitive products. They find that ASEAN, for example, would be 
better off with a series of bilateral agreements than with an Asian-inclusive approach, 
as this would allow them better to exploit their comparative advantage in agriculture, 
which is characterized by much higher levels of protection in the region than 
manufactures.   
 
Previous GCGE studies provide valuable insights on the likely economic effects of an 
ASEAN+3 FTA and an APEC FTA. There is a need to build on this literature and 
adopt a more comprehensive approach that incorporates the new reality of multiple 
FTA initiatives in East Asia, new data sources and recent modeling developments. 
Accordingly, the following six policy scenarios are considered in the GCGE modeling 
exercise: 
 
1) a fragmentation scenario: a continuation of the current wave of bilateralism, 
where the region is fragmented by several bilateral or small regional FTAs; 
2)  An ASEAN+3 FTA scenario: free trade among ASEAN countries; PRC+Hong 
Kong, China; Japan; and Korea; 
3) An ASEAN+6 FTA scenario: free trade among ASEAN+3 countries, India, 
Australia, and New Zealand; 
4)  An Asia-wide FTA Scenario: free trade among all Asian countries; 
5)  An APEC FTA: free trade among all APEC members; 
6)  A global trade liberalization scenario: complete abolition of import tariffs and 
export subsidies.  
Some comments on these scenarios is appropriate. Scenario 1 represents the 
current reality of multiple and overlapping bilateral/regional FTAs involving East 
Asian countries. Scenario 2 is included because this seems to be gradually taking 
shape with ASEAN having signed liberalization of goods agreements with both PRC 
and Korea
21 while negotiations with Japan are still ongoing. Although negotiations for 
an ASEAN+6 FTA have not yet begun, scenario 3 is considered because policy 
makers have become more conscious of the synergies to be gained by linking India 
and Australia-New Zealand with ASEAN+3. Scenario 5 is provided to represent the 
discussions among APEC economic ministers on ways to improve trade relations. 
Scenario 4 and 6 are included to enable comparisons of relative gains and losses 
from other scenarios with hypothetical cases. 
 
The estimates of the economic impacts of FTA scenarios were prepared using the 
Asian Development Bank’s General Equilibrium Model for Asia’s Trade (GEMAT). 
GEMAT—which is an applied general equilibrium model of the global economy with 
                                                 
21 However, negotiations on services with PRC and Korea are still ongoing.  
  19a focus on Asia—extends the LINKAGE model developed at the World Bank (see 
ADB 2006 for details of GEMAT). It has strong micro-foundations and captures 
detailed interactions among industries, consumers and governments, across the 
global economy. It is ideally suited for the analysis of structural changes over periods 
that are sufficiently long to allow markets to adjust and rigidities to work themselves 
out. Among other assumptions, GEMAT incorporates firm heterogeneity, fixed trade 
costs and imperfect competition.  
 
Table 3 summarizes the results for GDP and welfare in terms of equivalent variation 
for the six policy scenarios. It comes as little surprise that scenario 1—a fragmented 
reality of multiple bilateral and regional FTAs—is the least attractive for all regions 
and countries. Among others, this scenario may give rise to the famous “spaghetti” or 
“noodle bowl” effect which refers to higher transactions costs from multiple rules of 
origin and standards in the growing number of FTAs in East Asia. Global free trade 
(scenario 6) is the most attractive but unrealistic bearing in mind that even the WTO 
process has been beset by uncertainties on the timing and depth of multilateral 
agreement to reduce trade barriers.  
 
Also perhaps somewhat unrealistic, an APEC FTA (scenario 5) brings gains to 
Northeast Asia and the US but ASEAN witnesses less gains compared to scenario 1. 
The rest of Asia and Europe, which would be outside an APEC FTA, also lose 
relative to scenario 1.  
 
Under the ASEAN+3 Scenario (scenario 2), the welfare of members increases with 
Northeast Asia and ASEAN witnessing gains of 0.37% and 2.02%, respectively. 
Nonmembers (the rest of Asia, US and Europe) incur modest losses. Hence, these 
results are in line with that of previous CGCE studies on an ASEAN+3 FTA. If free 
trade among ASEAN+3, Australia, New Zealand, and India (scenario 3) were to be 
realized, Northeast Asia (0.58%) and ASEAN (2.06) are expected to capture even 
greater gains than under the ASEAN+3 FTA. However, non-members are likely to 
experience greater losses too. The Asia-wide FTA (scenario 4) would bring gains to 
























Free Trade    
In US$ Mn 2001 prices 
Northeast 
Asia  -1,219 21,724  34,460  35,713 56,734  72,944 
ASEAN 8,869  10,375  10,582 10,907  8,341  11,319 
Rest of 
Asia  -101  -425 -619 1,355  -1,560  4,288 
US -1,371 -2,362  -3,633 -3,263  12,035  22,884 
Europe  -1,021 -904 -1,597 -1,413  -3,047 25,325 
  20ROW -555  -464  -1,880 -2,291  280  14,861 
World 4,401  27,546  40,546 45,012  74,689 153,718 
  In % of GDP 
Northeast 
Asia  -0.02 0.37  0.58  0.60 0.96  1.23 
ASEAN 1.72  2.02  2.06 2.12  1.62 2.20 
Rest of 
Asia  -0.01 -0.06  -0.09 0.19  -0.22 0.61 
US -0.01  -0.02 -0.04 -0.03  0.12  0.24 
Europe -0.01  -0.01  -0.02 -0.02  -0.04 0.30 
ROW -0.01  -0.01  -0.04 -0.05  0.01  0.34 
World 0.01  0.09  0.14 0.15  0.25 0.51 
Source: ADB Staff estimates using GEMAT 
 
 
The impact of the three Asian FTA scenarios on East Asian economies is provided in 
Table 4. The ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 FTAs have different impacts on the three 
Northeast Asian economies. Korea is expected to see the largest gains (3.49%) 
under an ASEAN+3 FTA and these increase further (3.94%) under the ASEAN+6 
FTA. Japan experiences similar but modest gains under the two scenarios. However, 
the PRC (including Hong Kong, China) experiences small losses under the 
ASEAN+3 FTA which reduce somewhat under the ASEAN+6 FTA. The expected 
welfare losses to the PRC are a puzzle and preliminary research have attributed 
them to special features of regional trading patterns in Asia which induce a 
deterioration in PRC’s terms of trade.
22 Within ASEAN, the largest gains from 
ASEAN+3 FTA are likely to occur to Malaysia, Viet Nam, and Thailand though these 
gains fall somewhat for Malaysia and Thailand from an ASEAN+6 FTA.   
 
 
Table 4: Impact of Asian FTA Scenarios on East Asian Economies 


















FTA    
In US$ Mn 2001 prices  In % of GDP 
Japan 10,419  16,695  16,750 0.26  0.42  0.42 
PRC+Hong 
Kong, China  -1,638 -251  -35  -0.15 -0.02  0.00 
Korea 14,271  16,111  17,030 3.49  3.94  4.16 
Taipei,China -1,328  1,905 1,969 -0.49  0.71  0.73 
Indonesia 523  900  901  0.38  0.65  0.65 
Malaysia 3,941  3,613  3,627 4.62 4.24  4.26 
                                                 
22 See, for instance, Fan Zhai (2006) on this point. The results for PRC might also reflect the assumptions 
and underlying structure of the GEMAT model. Further research using different CGE models is needed to 
investigate the robustness of the results for PRC.  
  21Philippines 350  355  343  0.52  0.53  0.51 
Singapore 1,240  1,386  1,538 1.52 1.70  1.89 
Thailand 3,305  3,139  3,280 3.00 2.85  2.98 
Viet Nam  1,016  1,189  1,218 3.27 3.82  3.91 
Source: ADB Staff estimates using GEMAT 
 
 
GCGE simulation studies are useful in indicating the channels by which the formation 
of an FTA translates into improvements of the economy. Existing studies have 
focused on liberalization of import tariffs on goods trade. A major shortcoming of 
such studies is their inability to incorporate rules of origin and non-tariff measures 
(e.g. SPS and TBT) which are likely to afford more protection for domestic industries 
than tariffs. In addition, there are no GCGE studies on liberalization of barriers to 
services trade. Furthermore, in these approaches, it is unclear whether the members 
of an FTA ultimately realize potential effects. Thus, GCGE studies are best when 
used in conjunction with other empirical tools—notably analysis of the complex 
structure of FTAs and enterprise perception studies of the benefits of FTAs 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we evaluated, inter alia, the economic prospects of economic 
integration in Asia.  We reviewed the current evolution of trade and financial accords 
in the region and surveyed the literature on the economic viability of these accords, 
including some fresh simulations on the correlation of business cycles and the 
economic effects of potential trade groupings being considered. In general, the paper 
suggests that the economic potential for monetary integration in Asia is strong, even 
though the political underpinnings of such an accord are not yet in place. On the 
other hand, real integration has been taking place at the bilateral, plurilateral, and 
regional levels; we note that the economic implications of these emerging 
agreements will actually reinforce the economic case for monetary union in Asia, in a 
similar way that real-sector integration did so in Europe. Hence, we conclude that, at 
present, the post-sequencing of economic integration in Asia is developing such that 
trade agreements, which are dominating the formal accords in Asia, will ultimately 
complement the movement toward financial and monetary integration, which will take 
a great deal more time and political will.     
 
In addition to the structural considerations discussed above, we should note that the 
process of monetary union could have important implications for policy. Based on the 
EU experience, closer financial and monetary cooperation in Asia in general and in 
ASEAN in particular will necessitate Maastricht-type exigencies to create a more 
stable macroeconomic environment in the region, thereby producing significant 
positive policy externalities. Moreover, as monetary policy would likely be driven by 
the most credible country/countries, less credible countries would be able to "import 
  23credibility," much as, for example, Italy was able to import German monetary 
credibility, and interest-rate spreads would converge, making it easier to price risk at 
the regional level and lower the cost of capital. Our casual empiricism in Section III 
suggested that policy convergence might be difficult in some cases but certainly 
feasible. 
 
Further, existing studies on monetary union in Europe tend to focus on 
macroeconomic considerations, and overlook another key economic argument: 
financial market development, which is a key reason why ASEAN leaders are 
considering monetary cooperation and integration in the first place. The creation of a 
common currency could go a long way in helping the ASEAN countries diversity and 
deepen their capital markets, as well as create new regional equity and securities 
markets.   
 
In fact, it is worth recalling that the European Currency Unit (ECU) was a basket of 
the currencies of the member countries of the EC, weighted in line with each 
country's gross domestic product and foreign trade (and therefore subject to change 
periodically). It was introduced in 1979 as part of the EMS, to be used as the 
benchmark for determining the overvaulation/undervaluation of individual currencies 
and to serve as a unit of account among the central banks participating in the EMS.  
No physical ECU notes or coins ever circulated, so the ECU was strictly an artificial 
denomination. However, certain European banks established a banking product so 
that lenders and borrowers could carry out transactions in ECU. The first ECU-
denominated bond was issued in 1981, just 2 years after the introduction of the 
currency basket. The ECU subsequently became a significant "currency" 
denomination in the Eurobond markets, outranked only by the US dollar and the 
German mark. In short, the ECU was an attractive alternative to single foreign 
currencies because it was less sensitive to the volatility of a single currency. The fact 
that the ECU existed for 20 years prior to European monetary unification suggests 
that the simple introduction of a currency basket serves as a useful precursor to 
monetary union.  The literature has not ignored this experience; in fact, the ADB and 
other institutions have been developing various possible exchange-rate indexes for 
the region (see, for example, Ogawa and Shimizu 2006). 
 
As a final point, we should note that the process of creating FTAs at various levels 
has an important political effect on cementing a regional “identity” and in bringing the 
region closer together.  The proliferation of superficial FTAs in the world testifies to 
the political usefulness of such agreements.  Indeed, it would be impossible to 
understand the unfolding of regionalism in Asia (or in Europe, for that matter) from a 
merely economic perspective:  there exist strong political and strategic motivations 
behind this movement.  Given that many see the chief problem of monetary union in 
Asia as being political (unlike in Europe), the “endogeneity” effect noted by Frankel 
and Rose (1998) could very well have its counterpart in the political realm. In this 
sense, the FTAs are serving as a political, as well as economic, complement, to 
monetary union. 
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India Indonesia Japan Korea, Rep of Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Taipei,China Thailand Vietnam
Brunei Darussalam 1.0
Cambodia 0.2 1.0
PRC -0.1 0.4 1.0
Hong Kong, China -0.1 0.6260* 0.1 1.0
India -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 1.0
Indonesia 0.3 -0.5 -0.2 0.3 0.1 1.0
Japan -0.1 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 1.0
Korea, Rep of 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.4 0.2 1.0
Lao PDR -0.2 -0.6715* -0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.4 -0.2 -0.6025* 1.0
Malaysia 0.6202* -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.6049* -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 1.0
Myanmar 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.6934* -0.5778* 0.7255* 0.1 1.0
Philippines 0.2 0.1 -0.4984* 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 1.0
Singapore 0.5 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4953* -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.8015* 0.0 0.5699* 1.0
Taipei,China -0.2 0.6258* 0.2 0.7984* -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 0.1 1.0
Thailand 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.4762* 0.4 -0.3 0.4 -0.4 0.2 0.4 0.1 1.0
Vietnam 0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.5405* 0.4 -0.2 -0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.0






India Indonesia Japan Korea, Rep of Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Taipei,China Thailand Vietnam
Brunei Darussalam 1.0
Cambodia 0.3 1.0
PRC 0.4 -0.4 1.0
Hong Kong, China 0.7 0.5 0.4 1.0
India 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.0
Indonesia 0.9466* 0.2 0.5 0.7985* 0.1 1.0
Japan 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.9133* 0.4 0.8066* 1.0
Korea, Rep of 0.8267* 0.6 0.0 0.7260* -0.1 0.8013* 0.5 1.0
Lao PDR 0.7667* 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.7292* 0.5 0.7807* 1.0
Malaysia 0.8131* 0.6 0.4 0.9249* 0.3 0.8738* 0.8034* 0.8829* 0.7776* 1.0
Myanmar 0.5 0.2 -0.3 0.0 -0.6 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 1.0
Philippines 0.7155* 0.3 0.6 0.9410* 0.4 0.8562* 0.8865* 0.7312* 0.7 0.9503* 0.1 1.0
Singapore 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.8867* 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8493* -0.1 0.8528* 1.0
Taipei,China -0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.5 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.4 0.7554* 1.0
Thailand 0.9393* 0.4 0.5 0.7763* 0.2 0.9564* 0.7298* 0.8450* 0.7948* 0.9227* 0.3 0.8703* 0.6 0.1 1.0
Vietnam 0.4 -0.5 0.9213* 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.5 0.1 -0.2 0.4 1.0
*Significant at 5% level.
1/ Annual data are used in the computation.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.
A. 1980 - 1997
B. 1998 - 2005
Appendix Table 1: Correlation of GDP Growth Rates of East Asian Economies: 1980 – 2005 
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